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Previous studies have shown that regulated ﬁrms diversify for reasons that are different
than for unregulated ﬁrms. We explore some of these differences by providing a theoretical
model that starts by considering the ﬁrm–regulator relationship as an incomplete informa-
tion issue, in which a regulated incumbent has knowledge that the regulator does not have,
but the ﬁrm cannot convey hard information about this knowledge. The incumbent faces
both market and nonmarket competition from a new entrant. In that context, we show that
when the ﬁrm faces tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create
a mechanism that makes information transmission to the regulator more credible.
International expansion can thus be a way to solve domestic nonmarket issues in addition
to being a catalyst for growth. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1. INTRODUCTION
The international diversiﬁcation of regulated ﬁrms
issue, that is, their expansion into foreign countries,
is an understudied yet important topic in the economics
and management literature (Calzolari, 2004; Garcia
Canal and Guillen, 2008; Kashlak and Joshi, 1994).
The purpose of this paper is to offer a new rationale,
complementary to those highlighted in previous litera-
ture, accounting for the geographical diversiﬁcation of
these ﬁrms and how they pick their target countries.
To date, the literature on the diversiﬁcation of
regulated ﬁrms has put forward an argument that can
be summarized in the following way1: when regulated
ﬁrms are engaged in difﬁcult, even hostile and high-
transaction-cost relationships with their regulatory
authority, and as they do not have the opportunity
to solve this transaction-cost issue through vertical
integration, they tend to diversify out of their core busi-
ness and into unregulated activities. Russo (1992) found
support for this argument in the case of US electric util-
ities. Kashlak and Joshi (1994) made a similar argument
but point out that, instead of engaging in unregulated
activities, regulated ﬁrms might also invest in interna-
tional diversiﬁcation if the ﬁrm’s home market displays
slow growth. These authors also ﬁnd some empirical
support for their argument by looking at US telecommu-
nications operators.
From a theoretical point of view, however, this
literature presents several limitations. First, the nature
of the potentially hostile ﬁrm–regulator relationship
is never clearly modelled. In most empirical studies,
the nature of the relationships (from collaborative to
hostile) is measured using variables relative to the
‘Regulatory Climate’ collected by analysts (see, for
instance, Geiger and Hoffman, 1998, or Russo,
1992). These measures are instructive, but they are
of little help in building a theory as to why these
relationships impact corporate diversiﬁcation. In what
*Correspondence to: HEC Paris, Jouy-en-Josas, France. E-mail:
quelin@hec.fr
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
Manage. Decis. Econ. (2012)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/mde.2598
follows, we will propose that the core part of these
sometimes hostile relationships is the imperfect infor-
mation faced by both the regulator and the higher
political institutions (e.g. government and parliament)
delegating the task when the former has to make regula-
tory decisions. As highlighted by much of the Industrial
Organization literature, regulated ﬁrms have private
information that would be relevant for the regulator
and their political principals. At the same time, it is also
obvious that the ﬁrm, the regulator and the delegating
politicians often have misaligned interests (Laffont and
Tirole, 1993). As a result, when the ﬁrms try to convey
soft, that is, non-veriﬁable information to the policy-
makers, they face a credibility issue.2 This makes
ﬁrm–regulator and regulator–politician relationships
difﬁcult, which might thus impact the ﬁrm’s decision
to diversify out of its core market.
Second, even if the ﬁrm’s relationships with the reg-
ulators are hostile, there are alternative strategies that
ﬁrms can develop, such as lobbying or, more generally,
nonmarket strategies (de Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001;
Holburn and Van den Bergh, 2008). Following Baron
(2001), we refer to nonmarket strategies as all the activ-
ities developed by ﬁrms to inﬂuence policy-makers.
Many activities belong to nonmarket strategies, such
as informational lobbying, interest group formation,
campaign contributions, constituency building and me-
dia campaigns (Hillman et al., 2004). Baron (1995)
shows many examples of how these nonmarket strate-
gies can be effectively integrated with market strategies
(such as price strategies, differentiation, technology
development and diversiﬁcation), in the context of both
domestic and international strategies (Baron, 1997).
Hence, there are good reasons to believe that regulated
ﬁrms—at least the incumbents—will be efﬁcient at
developing these nonmarket strategies as (i) they are
large entities and often have deep pockets (de Figueiredo
and Edwards, 2007); (ii) they can build on organized
constituencies, especially employees; and (iii) they
generally have superior lobbying skills and capabili-
ties developed through decades of interactions with
policy-makers (Bonardi, 2004). In a study of US elec-
tric utilities, Bonardi et al. (2006) conﬁrmed that these
regulated ﬁrms develop nonmarket strategies and are
often successful when they do so. Our aim is thus to
answer the following questions: what role do these
nonmarket strategies play in the ﬁrm–regulator rela-
tionship, and how do they impact diversiﬁcation strat-
egies? When are these nonmarket activities effective,
and when are they not?
Third, although the existing literature on regulated
ﬁrm nonmarket strategies might explain diversiﬁcation,
it cannot disentangle product and geographic diversiﬁ-
cations. Both can indeed be strategic options for ﬁrms
wishing to free themselves from very demanding or
hostile regulatory supervision. But does this mean they
are perfect substitutes for regulated ﬁrms, or is there
something else that is achieved only through geographic
diversiﬁcation? The point that has not been taken into
account so far in the existing literature is that diversiﬁca-
tion in unregulated or regulated sectors and in domestic
or international markets has very different implications
regarding ﬁrm–regulator relationships. Whereas invest-
ing in product diversiﬁcation does little to change these
relationships, international expansion helps the regula-
tor to obtain (or forces him or her to take into account)
comparable information about what the ﬁrms are doing
in other (also regulated) markets. Whereas product
diversiﬁcation allows a partial escape from regulatory
intervention (or its incidence over global proﬁts), inter-
national diversiﬁcation separates, but does not reduce,
overall regulatory exposure. This will be a key aspect
of our approach in this paper.
Beyond these theoretical issues, others appear when
one looks at simple empirics regarding the international
strategies of regulated ﬁrms. Consider for instance the
analysis proposed by Kashlak and Joshi (1994) in their
analysis of the geographical diversiﬁcation of US tele-
com operators. These authors position the operators on
the basis of two dimensions—the ﬁrm’s core business
growth and a measure of the regulatory restrictions the
ﬁrm is facing in its home market. From there, they
hypothesize that regulated ﬁrms will tend to diversify
when core market growth is low and regulatory restric-
tions are high. We reproduce a comparable analysis
of European telecommunication operators to check
whether they follow a similar pattern regarding their
decision to expand in foreign countries. Figure 1 plots
the international strategies of former telecom monopo-
lies in Europe. The X-axis displays the number of main
lines per inhabitant as a proxy for the country’s remain-
ing market potential (a high value indicating lowmarket
growth potential), and the Y-axis displays the incum-
bent’s market shares in the wireless home market as a
proxy for how restrictive regulatory decisions have been
for the former monopolies.3
Following Kashlak and Joshi’s logic, operators in
the top left quadrant of Figure 1 should also be the
least international ones (as measured by the number
of foreign countries they have invested in which
Goerzen and Beamish (2003) call geographic scope),
as they face lower regulatory restrictions in their
home market and have sufﬁcient market growth
potential to exploit there. For the opposite reasons,
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operators in the bottom right should be among the
most international ones.
But, is this so? Figure 1 also indicates the interna-
tionalization strategy followed by various former
monopolies, as measured by the number of foreign
countries entered by each one of them since 1995.4
We can see that various cases adjust to this prediction
(such is the case of Portugal, KPN, Belgacom, British
Telecom (BT) and Deutsche Telekom). However,
contrary to what was predicted, there are also opera-
tors in the top left quadrant that are quite international
(especially Spain’s Telefonica). Similarly, there are
some operators that are both strong at home and oper-
ate domestically in mature markets (top right quadrant
in Figure 1), leaving no clear prediction regarding
internationalization, according to the existing litera-
ture. France Telecom (FT) and Telia, for instance,
internationalize much more than their strong nonmarket
inﬂuence would predict for defensive reasons at home,
suggesting their goal of achieving higher growth poten-
tial abroad.
How can this be explained? In the following, we
suggest that there might be another potential set of
factors inﬂuencing the international expansion of
regulated ﬁrms, that is, the exploitation of information
and visibility collected abroad used as a way to pro-
vide a benchmark for the regulator, thereby improving
the nonmarket position of ﬁrms at home. If ﬁrms face
a credibility deﬁcit when they deal with domestic
regulators—as they can only communicate soft and
hard-to-verify information (Lyon and Maxwell,
2004)—and cannot easily compensate for this through
alternative nonmarket tactics (such as campaign contri-
butions, as in de Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007),5 they
might increase the impact of their informational lobby-
ing by providing comparative benchmarks that come
from their foreign investments. This might be a key
driver of these (but not all) operators’ international
expansion. On the other hand, regulated ﬁrms that are
not challenged domestically might invest abroad for
completely different reasons. For these ﬁrms, such as
FT in our sample, investing in institutionally close
countries might not be a critical factor.
We also show that this has implications for the
destinations where regulated ﬁrms invest. For the
ﬁrm to use international expansion as a way to build
a credible benchmark, there needs to be some
institutional proximity between the home and target
countries. We call institutional proximity the degree
to which two countries share similar institutional
arrangements and formal institutions in their regu-
latory system.6 Firms that try to build a relevant
benchmark for their domestic regulator will have
to invest in close countries more often. On the other
hand, ﬁrms that do not need to build this benchmark
(because they already have a strong nonmarket
inﬂuence over their home regulator) will relatively
tend to invest in institutionally far (different)
countries, especially if these countries display higher
potential growth.
Note: The number of foreign countries entered by each operator is indicated after the operator’s name.
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Going back to the case of European telecom opera-
tors, we explore this proposition and calculate an
‘index of alike internationalization’—that is, an index
of investment in institutionally close countries—as the
ratio of the number of neighbour countries (in this case
Western European countries) divided by the total num-
ber of countries in which the operator has invested.7 In
Figure 2, we plot this index (on the Y-axis) with the
operator’s remaining market shares in the wireless
segment (again, as a proxy of the ﬁrm’s faced regulatory
toughness, which is also a measure of its nonmarket
inﬂuence at home). The outcome is quite sharp: all the
operators are positioned either in the top left or in the
bottom right segments of the graph. Operators that have
relatively low nonmarket inﬂuence/capabilities and that
have decided to concentrate their international invest-
ment on neighbouring countries are in the top left quad-
rant. Operators in the bottom right segment, who face
softer pro-entrant regulations and thus are said to have
strong nonmarket inﬂuence in their home market, tend
to invest in countries that are (relatively) farther from
them institutionally. This indicates that companies
facing a nonmarket disadvantage domestically tend
to invest nearby, whereas companies that hold a non-
market advantage domestically tend to invest farther
from home.8
One ﬁnal comment is in order regarding the relation
of our paper with Calzolari (2004). He also considers
the regulation of a monopolist multinational ﬁrm by
two independent national regulators in the context
of lobbying under asymmetric information, but a
multinational enterprise’s (MNE) private information
regards a single production parameter determining
interdependent costs in both countries. Depending on
cross-effect of production on costs across countries,
the MNE can exploit different social preferences of
national regulators depending on the nationality of the
owners of the ﬁrm, enjoying also an improved bargain-
ing position by threatening to shutdown production in a
more demanding regulatory environment. In that regard,
regulated ﬁrms also ﬁnd a strategic beneﬁt from interna-
tionalization within the same regulated industry. Yet,
although less technical, our model tries to capture a
situation where the MNE competes with other ﬁrms
in each country and the internationalization beneﬁt
emerges from a superior capacity to transmit favourable
information into the national regulatory proceedings
instead of coming from cost externalities emerging
from the level of production in each country or from
a more credible exit threat by the MNE, which we ﬁnd
less appealing for infrastructure industries with large
sunk costs.
The purpose of the model developed in the next
section is to formally demonstrate the intuitions illus-
trated in the case of the European telecom operators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the foundation of a model that could account
for some of these anomalies. The formal model itself
is analysed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results
and makes some conclusions.
2. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
In our model, we consider one sector that has been
traditionally regulated and builds on an infrastructure
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network (i.e. telecommunications or electricity) in one
country. The policy issue has to do with the determi-
nation of an access price (for ﬁxed, wire-line services)
that an entrant ﬁrm has to pay to the incumbent and
owner of the infrastructure. The game includes one
regulator (R) and two ﬁrms/interests, denoted by j = I,
E: one ﬁrm is the incumbent (I) and the other is the
entrant (E).9 We ﬁrst consider a case where each ﬁrm
is purely domestic, and then we analyse the changes
when one ﬁrm expands into a foreign country.10 Final
users (and governments in general) beneﬁt when
the policies implemented adjust well to the true under-
lying conditions (state of nature), which is more likely
when the regulator enjoys less discretion and is
required to base him or her decisions on publicly
available elements.
In order to capture the basic intuition, various simpli-
fying assumptions are adopted. First, we make some
assumptions, which, although considered reasonable,
do minimize the theoretical options regarding possible
signalling games oriented to transmit private infor-
mation. Second, we assume that a ﬁrst-best regulation
(i.e. marginal cost pricing) is feasible under complete
information.11
2.1. The Firms and the Regulator
As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) or Grossman and
Helpman (1994), the two interests behave as principals
that seek to contract with the regulatory authority for
the policy, and the regulatory authority is thus a
(de facto) common agent of the two interests.12 The
regulator, in turn, is the formal agent of higher politi-
cal government institutions (who we assume truly
represents the ﬁnal users of the regulated service).
Objective functions for the regulator and the ﬁrms
are built upon quadratic loss functions regarding the
most preferred policies by each agent (Baron, 2001);
ﬁrms lobby for their most desired policy through
transfers/support transmitted to the regulator; the regu-
lator balances efﬁciency (consumer representation or
industry performance, based on available information)
and its private interest (support received from interest
groups—regulated ﬁrms—minus expected penalties
to be incurred in case he or she is proven to be adopt-
ing biased or inefﬁcient decisions).
A key assumption in our model, then, is that regu-
lators tend to adopt policies that ‘cover their back’. By
this, we mean that an important aspect for regulators
is to avoid being penalized by the governing politi-
cians supervising them. Hence, when a piece of infor-
mation that might have some credibility is signalled to
politicians, it will be costly for regulators to ignore it
(Bonardi et al., 2006). Thus, as long as regulators
can relatively credibly justify their policy choices
using this piece of information, their ‘back is covered’.
This assumption ﬁts with regulatory practices as expli-
cated by Hyman (2000).
It is noteworthy that the modelling implication of
this assumption is that regulators generally do not set
up truth-revealing incentive mechanisms to obtain
the best information. Even less so is the case for
government ofﬁcials dealing with multiple issues and
delegating regulation to specialized bodies. Even if this
mechanism would seem to be more elegant and in line
with now-standard information economics models
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993), we concentrate on keeping
our model closer to real regulatory practice.
To maximize efﬁciency—for a given set of transfers
or supports received from regulated ﬁrms—the regula-
tor must base him or her decision on the information
he or she has regarding the cost of providing access to
the existing network operated by the incumbent ﬁrm.
An access price (or rate) set too high would allow the
incumbent to retain excessive monopoly rents, whereas
an access price set too low would eventually lead to a
deterioration of the network coverage and/or quality,
ultimately hurting the ﬁnal users (i.e. overall perfor-
mance) of the regulated services in both cases. Thus,
as the regulator is imperfectly informed about the true
cost of access, his or her decision could be biased away
from efﬁciency. To minimize this bias, higher political
government ofﬁcials (and ﬁnal users) would welcome
credible information that pushes the regulator to mini-
mize the potential error of his or her cost estimate.
2.2. Network Costs, Information and Reports
The marginal cost of the existing network is given by
C(d), where d is a vector of both idiosyncratic and
common parameters (such as country size, income,
density, cost of capital and available technology
adjusting to those conditions); C(d) can be positively
correlated across different countries, depending on
their structural similarities with respect to their key
parameters d.
The informational assumption is that (all) ﬁrms
know d in the countries where they participate, but
the regulator and the higher political government ofﬁ-
cials (G) do not. More precisely, the regulator receives
an unbiased signal from nature—which is, in fact, his
or her honest deconstruction of all the evidence con-
sulted to determine those parameters—but higher
political government ofﬁcials are fully uninformed.13
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Firms supply reports with information about the state
of the world regarding d, which contains both ‘hard’
(veriﬁable) and ‘soft’ (unveriﬁable) information. Veri-
ﬁable information truncates the support of the cost
function within which R receives the unbiased signal
from nature: the hard (but selective) information
supplied by the ﬁrms convinces R that dmax≥ d≥
dmin; unveriﬁable information is used by R to con-
struct its prior belief about the cost C. Thus, both R
and G understand that ﬁrms could safely report C(dr),
where drj Є [d
min, dmax].14
The regulator has only one instrument at hand: set-
ting an access price (a), which in turn determines both
the beneﬁts obtained by the incumbent and the entrant,
and the overall performance of the sector.15
When one of the ﬁrms is a multinational (M), the
report it sends can have different advantages regarding
its credibility. First, this signal could become more
compelling or credible for both R and G because some
of the determinants of the network costs are common
across countries (i.e. M is in a better position to
convey information about the other country’s situation
in a more coherent and credible way), and/or because
M’s various reports have to be relatively consistent
across countries and thus should be less biased (i.e. M
would have to provide some relatively damaging hard
information—for instance, if M is the incumbent, it
might provide information, allowing a reduction in
dmax). Second, even if R is not further convinced by this
new piece of information (because he or she had already
consulted it on his or her own or because there is no
implication for increased consistency), G would now
know that such information was indeed exposed to R
during the regulatory proceedings and could adopt
the report as its own prior or benchmark to examine
R’s choices in implying deviations from it. Third, G
might be less aware than R about the idiosyncratic dif-
ferences of costs across (otherwise similar) countries
and thus might adopt this (visible) report as its own
prior on which to base its posterior monitoring
activity.
In this paper, and only for modelling reasons, we
adopt the following assumption: a report by M does
not modify C’s support (i.e. [C(dmin), C(dmax)]
remains unchanged), but it becomes the expected
policy by G, forcing R to justify more carefully—with
a cost—the policies deviating from it. Thus, higher
level political government ofﬁcials monitor R’s
use of the information supplied by M, inducing R to
give more weight to M’s reports because the correla-
tion of network costs across countries is expected to
be higher.
2.3. Games Sequence
The sequence of the game goes as follows:
• First, nature chooses the vector d of idiosyncratic
and common technology parameters.
• Second, government ofﬁcials state their monitor-
ing strategy regarding the policy chosen by the
regulator, including the penalties they will apply
if he or she is found to be following his or her
own agenda (making biased decisions by neglect-
ing some veriﬁable information submitted by the
regulated ﬁrms).
• Third, ﬁrms observe the true d in the countries
where they participate and send signals (reports
C(drj)), which inform R thatC’s support is [C(d
min),
C(dmax)].
• Fourth, ﬁrms exert pressure on the regulator to
inﬂuence the price of access he or she will set.
• Fifth, the regulator implements policy (sets the
access price a*) on the basis of the incentives
faced (i.e. the information collected, the pressure
of ﬁrms in the political regulatory process and the
expected penalty for disregarding veriﬁable infor-
mation supplied by regulated ﬁrms).
• Finally, pay-offs develop.
The Nash equilibrium of this incomplete information
game is solved backwards: given the informational
lobbying directed to convince the regulator about
favourable costs of access, in anticipation of the regula-
tor’s reaction function, both ﬁrms simultaneously
choose their supports, and then, given these decisions,
a policy is implemented by the regulatory authority.
3. MODEL ANALYSIS
As pointed out, the key issue for the regulator is the
determination of the access price, a, within an interval
depending on possible values of C(d) as shown in
Figure 3: aЄ [Cmin, Cmax]. a* =C would be the ﬁrst-
best policy. The unbiased signal (within C’s support,
resulting from the reports and information collected)
received by R determines his or her prior belief about
C, called CP.
The utility function for ﬁrm j = I,E is
uj að Þ ¼ $aj % a$ C j
! "2
; (1)
where Cj denotes ﬁrm j’s preferred report (incumbents
prefer Cmax, i.e. CI=Cmax; and entrants prefer Cmin, i.e.
CE=Cmin), aj denotes the importance of the policy
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for ﬁrm j, and it turns out to also represent the non-
market strength or inﬂuence of this ﬁrm in the regula-
tory game.16 Naturally, these utilities are negative
unless we add a positive constant, but it is important
that the maximum level be reached at a*=Cj and that
the marginal disutility increases with further departures
from this point.
Firms offer support sj(a), and policy preferences
for each ﬁrm are the following: Uj = uj(a)$ sj(a). For
simplicity, the support functions are assumed to be
linear, in the following way: sI(a) =o% (a$CE) and
sE(a) = l% (CI$ a). That is, the incumbent transfers
to the regulator o per unit of deviation from its less-
desired policy (CE) and the entrant pays his or her l
per unit of deviation from his or her own less-desired
policy (CI). Thus, sI(a)≥ 0 and sE(a)≥ 0.
Although in a ‘truthful equilibrium’ (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986) the marginal supports offered by each
principal reﬂect their marginal utilities for each feasible
policy chosen by the agent (and these decrease as they
approach each principal’s preferred point), we restrict
our attention to linear incentive schemes for three main
reasons. First, because at the equilibrium (correctly
anticipated by each principal), the linear incentive
schemes do coincide with each principal’s marginal
utility. Second, because we ﬁnd it unrealistic that the
regulated ﬁrms formally expose a support function
announcing each marginal reward attached to all pos-
sible actions taken by the regulator, the agent would,
at most, perceive the rewards as linear schemes (and
react accordingly to them). Third, working with linear
incentive functions simpliﬁes the mathematical solu-
tion of the model.
More generally, even though our restriction implies
that the support functions are not truthful everywhere,
they are truthful at the equilibrium (i.e. they reﬂect the
marginal utility derived from the equilibrium policy
chosen by the agent), and they are ‘relatively truthful’
off the equilibrium, leading to a unique Nash equilib-
rium. In other words, this would be an example of what
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) described as ‘an irrele-
vant way’ in which equilibrium (linear) strategies depart
from (fully) truthful ones.
The outcome for consumers—allocative efﬁciency
P—symmetrically depends on the difference between
the access price and the true marginal cost of access, that
is, P(a) =$ θ% (a$C)2. (Ex ante, though, expected
performance is maximized when a*=CP.) That is,
setting an access price above the marginal cost of access
to the network triggers a higher ﬁnal price Pf that hurts
consumers, whereas an access price below that cost
leads to a deterioration of investment to maintain and
expand the network, also hurting the ﬁnal users.
3.1. Regulator and Firm Nonmarket Strategies
In our model, we concentrate on two types of nonmarket
strategies: (i) support (of any kind) provided by ﬁrms to
the regulator (as in Baron, 2001) and (ii) informational
lobbying to convey soft information. As both ﬁrms
(the incumbent and the entrant) provide nonmarket
support in favour of certain regulatory decisions, the
regulator is assumed to balance the support received
from the interest groups (regulated ﬁrms I and E) with
its intrinsic willingness for good performance (as repre-
senting consumer surplus or allocative efﬁciency out of
ﬁrst-best policy or marginal cost pricing), so that
UR ¼ P að Þ þ sI að Þ þ sE að Þ: (2)
As R does not observe d (within [dmin, dmax]), his or
her decisions are based on his or her beliefs about it.
At the same time, without any other constraint by their
political superiors, R can justify any policy that he or
she chooses on the basis of dЄ [dmin, dmax] as the
optimal performance attainable, given the information
that he or she has about d. Indeed, even though the
higher political ofﬁcials are fully uninformed regard-
ing the support of the cost function, the two ﬁrms are
informed about the support within which R has to
make his or her decision, and they could claim a
review if he or she steps outside that range. Without loss
of generality, we assume that R’s expected cost (CP) is
equally distant from C(dmin) and C(dmax) (i.e. (CP) =
[C(dmin) +C(dmax)]/2), and that both ﬁrms know this.
Can a multinational ﬁrm become more credible and
send a report to which the regulator gives more
weight? On the basis of the discussion at the end of
the previous section, the answer to this question would
be: Yes, it can. In particular, the regulator could be
penalized if found to have overlooked or minimized
Price to be 
set by the 
regulator
Maximum 
cost
(Incumbent’s 
preferred 
report)
Minimum 
cost
(Entrants’ 
preferred 
report)
Regulator’s 
prior belief
regarding 
cost
Cost
Cmin Ca CmaxCP
Figure 3. Policy space.
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information from another comparable country that was
submitted during the regulatory process, and as multi-
nationals have much better access to such information
than do other parties, ﬁrms obtain a strategic advantage
through internationalization. The magnitude of this ad-
vantage depends on the expected penalties faced by
the regulator, which in turn depend on the importance
given to the foreign country as an information bench-
mark by the higher political ofﬁcials themselves (this
is known before the ﬁrms play out their strategies in
front of the regulator—see the time sequence spelled
out earlier). In general, then, if a regulator faces a multi-
national, his or her discretion is reduced, as he or she
needs to implement a policy that gives more (or even
full) weight to the information supplied by M.
As regard the utility function of the regulator once
such penalties are feasible, the linear translation of the
assumption spelled out in the previous section results
in the following:
UR ¼ $θ% a$ CP
! "2 þ SI að Þ þ SE að Þ
$F % a$ CM! "2;
(3)
where the last term is added reﬂecting the increased
cost for R if he or she deviates from the report CM
(either because of the risk of being penalized by G or
because of the more careful justiﬁcation for increasing
departures of the policy implied by such a report).
Yet, for the sake of simplicity (and in posterior
computations), the ﬁrst and third terms of the preceding
function could be (imperfectly) combined, to re-express
R’s utility function in the following way:
UR ¼ $θ^ % a$ CPM
! "2 þ SI að Þ þ SE að Þ; (4)
where θ^ > θ represents the higher disutility (including
the expected penalty and/or the effort to justify a
policy based on own information) that R faces when
the policy chosen deviates from the one that he or
she is supposed to implement, which now, instead of
being his or her prior CP, becomes a prior that gives
more weight to the report CM (or drM ) sent in by the
multinational ﬁrm.17 In other words, the use that G
makes of the report CM ends up reﬂecting changes in
the decisions adopted by R, as if he or she cared more
about the performance of the sector (θ^ > θ) and had a
prior belief CPM that is closer to the preferred policy
by the multinational ﬁrm (i.e. CI>CM>CPM>CP).
Naturally, as the penalty F tends to disappear (in the
end, reaching the case in which there is no multina-
tional), the parameters of R’s utility function tend
towards those deﬁned in the absence of multinational
ﬁrms. Notice that if both the incumbent and the entrant
in a given country are multinational ﬁrms, then the
regulator would have to combine the (conﬂicting)
information provided by both of them, using each
report as relative proof to empirically base his or her
decision according to the different weights that he or
she believes (or has announced) G would give to the
different sources (i.e. trying to adjust its policy to the
optimal one that would be taken by the politicians
themselves on the basis of the importance they give
to the information supplied by the two ﬁrms, which
depends on which foreign countries they use for their
reports). In that regard, the discretion enjoyed by the
regulator is further reduced, and thus the productivity
of each transfer offered by the two ﬁrms is also lower,
reducing the rents retained by the regulator.
3.2. Complete Information
Under complete information, a simple (ﬁrst-best) solu-
tion is reached: a* =C(d). This is derived from the
regulator’s utility function when sI(a) = sE(a) = 0, as
has to be the case because, with complete information,
the regulator would be caught responding to interest
groups—and would presumably be heavily penalized
by his or her political superiors or the courts—if a* 6¼
C(d). The outcome in this case displays marginal cost
pricing and no space for the development of a credibil-
ity issue. In fact, no nonmarket strategies could take
place once the regulator could not justify departing
from ﬁrst-best policies.
The general case of regulated sectors, however, is
one of incomplete information. As explained before,
this is what creates the sometimes hostile relationships
between the regulated ﬁrms and the regulator. What
then happens under incomplete information in our
setting when ﬁrms are purely domestic actors? Later,
we explore the nature and implications of incomplete
information concerning the ‘true state of the world’.
3.3. Incomplete Information but No
Multinational Firm
Under our previous assumptions, and leaving aside the
veriﬁable components of the reports that deﬁne the
range of possible costs (i.e. [C(dmin),C(dmax)]), the soft
reports sent in by each ﬁrm cannot be veriﬁed in a court
of law, and thus it is completely up to the regulator to
announce his or her conclusion regarding the true state
of nature within this range. So, whatever decision is
made by Rwithin this range, no penalty can be imposed
on him or her. Thus, once the support of the cost
function [C(dmin),C(dmax)] is determined (and known
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by the regulator and the two ﬁrms), the common agency
equilibrium s'I að Þ; s'E að Þ; a'
! "
is deﬁned as
a' 2 argamax P að Þ þ s'I að Þ þ s'E að Þ (5)
with s'I að Þ 2 argsI :ð Þmax$ aI
% a' sI :ð Þ; s'E :ð Þ
! "$ CI# $2
$sI a' sI :ð Þ; s'E :ð Þ
! "! "
(6)
and s'E að Þ 2 argsE :ð Þmax$ aE
% a' sI' :ð Þ; sE :ð Þð Þ $ CE
# $2
$sE a' sI' :ð Þ; sE :ð Þð Þð Þ:
(7)
We assume that the two principals (ﬁrms) decide
on their support schedules ﬁrst and then the agent
(regulator) reacts to them. Nevertheless, when the
ﬁrms make their choice, each of them incorporates
the regulator’s reaction function, as determined by
the ﬁrst-order condition of his or her optimization
problem. As each principal attempts to make a sepa-
rate prediction of the support schedule offered by the
other principal, both principals recognizing that the
agent will optimally react to their aggregated support
schedules, equilibrium requires that those predictions
are correct.
From the convexity of the utility functions of all
players, an interior solution for the two support
schedules falls short of a coordinated solution be-
tween the two principals, whereby they would agree
on the overall incentive to be provided to the agent.
Furthermore, assuming that the support schedules
are differentiable, the interior solution is obtained
in the following way. First, from R’s problem, the
ﬁrst-order condition yields a' ¼ o$lð Þ2θ þ CP . Then,
if the two principals cannot offer support (o= l= 0)
or if their support simply balances out as they
provide equal absolute incentives to the regulator
(o* = l*), the equilibrium access price a* is set at
the expected (prior) best-policy level CP =E(C).
(The chosen policy, though, could turn out to be
ex-post inefﬁcient if the signal received by R was
biased.)
Next, taking into account R’s reaction function to
their own problems (i.e. replacing the previous
expression for a* in their optimization problems),
both competing ﬁrms decide on their support sche-
dules (i.e. on the values of o* and l*), according to
the following two ﬁrst-order conditions:
o : $ aI=θð Þ o$ lð Þ=2θþ CP $ CI
# $
$ o$ lð Þ=2θþ CP $ CE# $$ o=2θ ¼ 0; (8)
l : þ aE=θð Þ o$ lð Þ=2θþ CP $ CE
# $
þ o$ lð Þ=2θþ CP $ CI# $$ l=2θ ¼ 0:
(9)
Solving this system of equations for an interior
solution, we have18
o' ¼ $2½aIθ CP $ CI
! "þ θ2 CP þ CI $ 2CE! "
þaEaI CE $ CI
! $
= aE þ aI þ 3θð Þ;
(10)
l' ¼ 2½aEθ CP $ CE
! "þ θ2 CP þ CE $ 2CI! "
þaEaI CI $ CE
! $
= aE þ aI þ 3θð Þ:
(11)
From these two equations, we obtain
o' $ l' ¼ 2θ½aE CE $ CP
! "þ aI CI $ CP! "
þθ CI þ CE $ 2CP! $= aE þ aI þ 3θð Þ;
(12)
and replacing this expression in the regulator’s choice
function a' ¼ o$lð Þ2θ þ CP, we have
a' ¼
h
aE CE $ CP
! "þ aI CI $ CP! "
þθ CI þ CE $ 2CP
% i
= aE þ aI þ 3θð Þ þ CP:
(13)
From the ﬁrst of the last two equations, it is easy to
characterize the symmetric case: if the two ﬁrms have
the same intensity of preferences or capacity to inﬂu-
ence the regulatory policy (i.e. if aE = aI), and R’s
expected value CP is halfway between the two
extreme policies supported by the interest groups
(i.e. if CP = (CI +CE)/2), then l* =o*, leading to
a* =CP. So, under this scenario, if the true state of
nature C coincides with CP, the policy implemented
matches the ﬁrst-best option that maximizes perfor-
mance P(a). In the symmetric case where the two inter-
ests have equally intensive preferences and are also
equally distant from the expected state of nature CP
regarding their preferred policies, the (marginal) sup-
ports offered by each regulated ﬁrm are the same, and
the policy chosen by R turns out to be the one that
maximizes expected allocative performance P(a).
We can also verify that when CP= (CI+CE)/2, then
o*> l* if aI> aE, which means that the most interested
principal offers the highest support. In that sense,
adopted policies will generally be ex-ante biased with
respect to R’s belief (as long as the strength of principals
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through nonmarket strategies are unequal), but the biases
cannot be proven ex post by any one of the partici-
pants. Thus, it is natural that higher political govern-
ment ofﬁcials (G) would regret R’s discretion and
would prefer to ﬁnd ways to audit his or her decisions
or force him or her to reduce such discretion. They
would welcome, of course, information that mini-
mizes the risk of implementing an ex-post biased
policy regarding the true state of nature C.
More generally, from the last equation, and recal-
ling that CI>CP>CE, we can check that a* increases
with CP, it decreases with aE and it increases with aI.
Also, a* moves closer to CP when θ increases, that
is, when the performance is more affected by the
policy chosen.19 The numerical example developed
in Table 1 illustrates these various results.
Reading the results progressively from columns 1
to 6 of Table 1, we ﬁnd that:
(1) If θ is equal to or higher than aI and aE, then—
as would be the case with a fully honest regula-
tor—supports o and l are zero (they cannot be
negative), and the access price a* equals R’s
belief about C (i.e. CP).
(2) If θ is lower than aI and aE, an interior solution
develops; in the symmetric case (which we use
as the benchmark to derive other results), both
ﬁrms offer positive transfers, and the regulator
receives a positive rent, but policy is unbiased
as marginal transfers are equal to each other.
(3) If both ﬁrms I and E could coordinate their trans-
fers and offer no support (o =0 and l =0), then
the policy a* remains the same, but R’s rents
disappear (UR=0).
(4) When aI increases, both ﬁrms increase their
marginal supports, and policy a* is biased to-
wards I’s preferred one; yet, only R beneﬁts
from this situation (both I and E end up being
worse off).
(5) When θ increases, transfers are reduced, policy
remains unbiased, I and E’s utilities go up and
R’s utility goes down.
(6) When CP goes up, I’s marginal support o
decreases andE’smarginal support l increases, bi-
asing policy towards E’s preference relative to the
new CP; I is better off, but E and R are worse off.
We can thus formulate the following propositions:
Proposition 1a:
When the regulated incumbent and the new entrant are
domestic ﬁrms, the outcome of the regulatory game is
mainly driven by their relative nonmarket inﬂuence.
The stronger the incumbent’s capacity to provide sup-
port to the regulator, the stronger the departure from
the ﬁrst-best regulatory policy. However, the more sig-
niﬁcant the policy is in affecting the performance of
the sector, the smaller the magnitude of the departure
from the ﬁrst-best policy created by the incumbent’s
nonmarket inﬂuence.
Proposition 1b:
In case the regulated incumbent and the new entrant
are of comparable nonmarket inﬂuence, the adopted
Table 1. Policy and Rents Without Multinational Firms
Incomplete information equilibrium without multinational ﬁrms
1 2 3 4 5 6
Fully honest regulator Benchmark Coordination aI goes up θ goes up CP goes up
Values of parameters
aI 2 2 2 3 2 2
aE 2 2 2 2 2 2
θ 2 1 1 1 1.5 1
CP 3 3 3 3 3 4
CI 5 5 5 5 5 5
CE 1 1 1 1 1 1
Equilibrium values of supports, policy and utilities
o* 0.00 4.00 0.00 6.00 2.00 3.14
l* 0.00 4.00 0.00 5.50 2.00 4.86
o* + l* 0.00 8.00 0.00 11.50 4.00 8.00
o*$ l* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 $1.71
a* 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.00 3.14
UI $8.00 $16.00 $8.00 $22.69 $12.00 $13.63
UE $8.00 $16.00 $8.00 $19.75 $12.00 $18.20
UR 0.00 8.00 0.00 11.44 4.00 7.27
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regulation coincides with the ﬁrst-best policy, and ﬁr
ms spend resources to balance each other’s inﬂuence,
leaving rents to the regulator.
These propositions are relatively intuitive and will be
used as a baseline to assess the impact of regulated ﬁrm
internationalization. Presumably, (incumbent) regulated
ﬁrms will have less incentive to invest in geographical
diversiﬁcation if they can offer signiﬁcant support to
(i.e. exert high pressure on) the regulator and therefore
dominate entrants in the political game. In most
cases (particularly when the country’s regulatory policy
embraces competition and entry), however, the situation
will be more symmetrical in the nonmarket arena, and
the regulated ﬁrm will have to face entrants that will
match their political investment, force them to push their
own lobbying investment higher and will therefore lead
to a poor outcome in terms of regulated access price and
allowed proﬁts. Hence, this approach provides an expla-
nation for why regulated ﬁrms, in many cases, cannot
effectively rely on nonmarket strategies to overcome
the problem they face regarding the regulator (as high-
lighted in limitation 2 in Section 1). This is why
(ceteris paribus) geographical diversiﬁcation becomes
one of the best options for some regulated ﬁrms.
3.4. Internationally Diversiﬁed Regulated Firms
Assume ﬁrst that only one of the two regulated ﬁrms
(say the incumbent, I) is a multinational with opera-
tions in a country where the cost of access is known
to be positively correlated with the cost to be deter-
mined by the home regulator. Thus, by providing this
additional information in an enhanced report, which
we have assumed is ﬁrmly believed by higher govern-
ment political ofﬁcials (G), the regulator is faced with
a possible penalty imposed by political superiors if he
or she disregards (or fails to convincingly reject) the
information supplied by multinationals. To eliminate
the expected penalty, the regulator could simply give
full attention toM’s report. If he or she was anticipated
to behave in this way, both ﬁrms would not offer
any supports, bringing to zero the regulator’s rents.
In general, R could depart fromM’s report by carefully
providing arguments that justify differences between
the costs of access in the two involved countries. Thus,
he or she will balance out the higher expected cost
suffered by deviating from the policy fully on the basis
of M’s report with the beneﬁts derived from the sup-
ports that he or she is offered, still leading to an
interior solution now—ceteris paribus—biased vis-à-
vis the expected ﬁrst-best policy. Indeed, both ﬁrms
anticipate the higher cost suffered by R if he or she
deviates from the policy justiﬁable under M’s report
and will thus compute their transfers (supports) appro-
priately ex ante.
Notice that the expected penalty is presumably
higher and increases more rapidly when the two
countries involved are ‘institutionally closer’ to each
other (the costs of the two incumbents are more corre-
lated, and the expectation that R should rely on the other
country’s revealed information is higher), providing, in
this case, higher beneﬁts for being M. Indeed, part of
the higher credibility attached to M’s report is natural
because a biased report could be exposed by a proper
comparison with its report presented in the foreign
country, eventually causing embarrassment or damage
to the public image of the multinational ﬁrm. (Notice
that such credibility, thus, should be higher when M is
an incumbent in one country and an entrant in another
because the inconsistency of reports would otherwise
be maximum, but the idea is more general than this as
there is always some sacriﬁce in the amount of possible
misrepresentation across countries if the involved ﬁrm
is a multinational acting in both countries.)
As before, ﬁrms offer supports sj(a) and provide
biased information to the regulator. Given our previous
simplifying model assumptions, the transfers offered by
the ﬁrms adjust to the new parameters of R’s utility
function, that is, with higher θ (θ^ > θ, as R’s intrinsic
disutility regarding poor performance is composed of
the higher cost needed to justify his or her decisions
when these move away from the expected policy by
G), and increased prior belief CP (now replaced
by CPM>CP). That is, relative to the absence of a
multinational ﬁrm, the equilibrium corresponds to a
situation where both CP and θ simultaneously increase.
From the previous results in Table 1, and assuming that
the multinational is the incumbent (see columns 5 and 6),
we can see the following:
(i) When θ increases, marginal transfers l* and o*
are reduced, policy a* remains unbiased, I and
E’s utilities go up, and R’s utility goes down.
(ii) When CP goes up, I’s support o* decreases
and E’s support l* increases, thereby biasing
policy towards E’s preference relative to the
new CP; yet, compared with the benchmark
case where CP ¼ CIþCEð Þ2 , I is better off, but E
and R are both worse off.
So, combining the two effects, Table 2 contains
some numerical illustrations showing that when I
is a multinational—meaning that both CP and θ
increase—then
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(a) o* goes down, and even though l* could go
up, still o* + l* (i.e. the aggregate level of
marginal transfers received by R in equilib-
rium) always goes down.
(b) a* goes up (although not as much as CP).
(c) UI always goes up and UR always goes down,
but UE can go up or down. (UE is hurt by the
intention to implement CM>E(C), but it is
beneﬁted by the fact that both ﬁrms reduce their
marginal transfers once the regulator is less
responsive to them.)
These results can be summarized in the following
propositions:
Proposition 2a:
The smaller the regulated incumbent’s nonmarket ad-
vantage over the new entrant, the higher the impor-
tance of information transmission (versus providing
support) within its nonmarket strategy, and therefore
the stronger the incentive for the incumbent to interna-
tionalize in order to increase its credibility/inﬂuence
over the regulator.
Proposition 2b:
As internationalizing leads to a reduced scope of dis-
cretion for the regulator, both the regulated incumbent
and the new entrant adapt their nonmarket strategies:
marginal supports offered by each ﬁrm generally go
down, but even if they do not, their sum will do so
in equilibrium.
Notice that if the benchmark (without M) situation
was instead one of asymmetric nonmarket power, the
participation of a multinational could reduce or increase
the implemented policy bias vis-à-vis the expected
ﬁrst-best policy, depending on who had relatively
higher political strength prior to the higher credibility
gained by the diversiﬁcation. Yet, although this possi-
bility would make the ex-post effect on the higher
political ofﬁcials (and ﬁnal users) undeﬁned, the
reduced range of the possible bias beneﬁts G ex ante.
We can assume that the expected penalties imposed
on regulators if they disregard (choose to discard with-
out justiﬁcation) reports by M are positively related to
the similarities between the two countries with respect
to their regulatory environments: if there are closer
cultural, geographical and/or institutional links between
those countries, the importance given byG to such inter-
national information becomes very high, whereas such
importance (and thus the expected cost faced by R for
deviating from such a report) is relatively minor when
the two countries are ‘distant from each other’ (in those
same dimensions). Thus, it is logical to conclude that the
beneﬁts from internationalization (additional to other
beneﬁts and costs are not examined here) are higher
when the two countries where the multinational acts
are ‘close to each other’—that is, sufﬁciently similar
and connected regarding their regulatory systems. In
other words, the credibility gained by being in two
countries that are highly communicated and transparent
(to each other) is higher than if the multinational acts in
markets whose information ﬂows are poor or where the
idiosyncratic information in one country is not relevant
to strengthen the credibility of the report about the idio-
syncratic parameters in the other country.
Table 2. Policy and Rents with a Multinational Firm
Incomplete information equilibrium with a multinational (I=M; θ and CP both go up)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Benchmark Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 Example 5
Values of parameters
aI 2 2 2 2 2 2
aE 2 2 2 2 2 2
θ 1 1.5 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.5
CP 3 4 4 4 3.5 4.5
CI 5 5 5 5 5 5
CE 1 1 1 1 1 1
Equilibrium values of supports, policy and utilities
o* 4.00 0.76 2.19 $0.66 1.38 0.15
l* 4.00 3.24 4.21 2.26 2.62 3.85
o*+ l* 8.00 4.00 6.40 1.60 4.00 4.00
o*$ l* 0.00 $2.47 $2.02 $2.91 $1.24 $3.71
a* 3.00 3.18 3.16 3.19 3.09 3.26
UI $16.00 $8.31 $11.51 $5.11 $10.20 $6.36
UE $16.00 $15.37 $17.07 $13.68 $13.73 $16.94
UR 8.00 2.98 5.55 0.42 3.75 1.71
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Finally, notice that the enhanced credibility from
M’s report is not related to the size of the investment
abroad. Therefore, although returns for investments
abroad (which are decided upon for traditional reasons)
presumably depend on the amount invested, the diversi-
ﬁcations in close countries directed to gain credibility
might be of limited amounts, just enough to become
a relevant player capable of collecting the information
to be supplied to the home regulator (and, indirectly,
to higher political ofﬁcials).
Our data on the internationalization of telecom
operators do not allow us to check this point in gen-
eral, but we ﬁnd initial support by comparing the cases
of BT and FT. Recall that, according to Figure 2, BT is
characterized as a company whose investments abroad
might be particularly motivated by the strategic consid-
eration we develop in the paper (i.e. it is weak regarding
nonmarket strategies in the UK and thus seeks to im-
prove its home position by investing in neighbouring
countries), whereas FT is in the opposite situation (its
home strength seems to be quite high, and it tends to
invest more in far countries). Now, considering the
evidence in Table 3, this characterization gains addi-
tional support: considering only those investments in
close countries, BT’s moves are much smaller (as
shown by its stake in its close countries’ ventures
and the size of such ﬁrms) than those of FT.
Proposition 3:
Leaving other business features aside, (i) the (institu-
tionally) closer the countries in which the regulated in-
cumbent has invested and (ii) the more correlated the
idiosyncratic costs parameters among these countries,
the more positive the impact of internationalization
on the effectiveness of the ﬁrm’s nonmarket strategy
(i.e. information transmission to the regulator).
Notice that, as a corollary of this proposition, ﬁrms
that decide on the internationalization path for enter-
ing markets abroad, instead of limiting their activities
to their home countries where they are incumbents,
ﬁnd a positive externality at home as the new markets
they enter can serve as a benchmark and point of com-
parison. As this positive externality is higher in more
mature and correlated markets, this would explain busi-
ness strategies whereby long-time dominant players in
the home markets of developed countries choose to
enter neighbouring and institutionally similar markets
despite obtaining a lower rate of return on the accounted
investments abroad (as compared with that obtained, for
instance, in less developed and more distant countries,
with higher growth potential, where their strategies will
not so seriously enhance their credibility at home). In
other words, the differential proﬁtability of expansions
overseas might be missing some of the positive exter-
nalities obtained at home from various destinies
abroad: mediocre or unproﬁtable accounting ﬁgures
regarding investments in ‘close countries’, which
implicitly assume that beneﬁts at home in the absence
of that particular diversiﬁcation would have been the
same as those obtained after the international expan-
sion, might in fact be misleading. Our paper then
reinforces previous research suggesting that the
performance effect of diversiﬁcation cannot be un-
derstood without reference to its original motives.20
Finally, we can think of I and E as two multina-
tional ﬁrms, both reporting veriﬁable information that
is still biased but less so than when they do not need to
concern themselves with the consistency of reports
sent across countries. In this case, G could announce
an auditing of the decision adopted by R regarding
how R treated these two reports, weighting them
according to the relevance attached to the country for
which each M submits cost information. This situation
can be summarized—vis-à-vis the case where no mul-
tinational is involved—as one where the parameter θ
increases and the support of the cost function shrinks
in the two end points (i.e. Cmin increases and Cmax
decreases). While the increased credibility of a multi-
national depends on the signiﬁcance given to its report
vis-à-vis the other multinational’s report, the two ﬁrms
can now ‘commit’ to a lower support offered to the
regulator because the regulator becomes less prone to
exchange biases in policies for supports that could
lead him or her to a high penalty if G ﬁnds him or
her to have been captured by one of the two interests
offering transfers/supports.
Notice, further, that as the reports sent in by the two
ﬁrms are closer to each other, and they still contain the
true state of nature C as an intermediate value, higher
government ofﬁcials can be sure that the expected bias
in policy is now lower than that without multinational
ﬁrms. Indeed, G’s ability to monitor R’s behaviour is
signiﬁcantly improved by inducing the regulator to
justify departures from policy on the basis of reports that
are less extreme and that reduce his or her discretion.
Table 3. International Investments: France Telecom
Versus British Telecom
Average stake
in ventures in
close countries (%)
Average number
of clients in close
countries
France Telecom 78 6.25 million
British Telecom 42 2.68 million
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This leads, then, to our ﬁnal proposition.
Proposition 4:
When two competing multinationals are active in one
country, the discretion enjoyed by the regulator is
diminished, reducing the variability/indeterminacy
to which higher political ofﬁcials and ﬁnal users are
exposed. The highest beneﬁt goes to the multinational
ﬁrm submitting information about countries that are
considered to be more relevant, as benchmarks, by
government ofﬁcials.
4. PERSPECTIVES
This paper has attempted a step towards a better under-
standing of why and how regulated ﬁrms diversify and,
more precisely, why international diversiﬁcation creates
a speciﬁc advantage, which has not been identiﬁed by
the previous literature, compared with product diver-
siﬁcation. The model developed here suggests that
international diversiﬁcation might make sense for
some regulated ﬁrms even if they do not expect direct
beneﬁts from the international venture itself, and it
also allows us to identify the cases in which this
circumstance occurs. We do not argue that building
credibility is the only motive driving international
acquisitions of regulated ﬁrms, nor that informational
lobbying is restricted to such strategy. Rather, we
argue that this logic might play an important role
among other factors and in certain situations.
4.1. Contributions
This paper makes contributions to three areas of litera-
ture. First, it contributes to the International Business
literature, especially the literature on the beneﬁts of
multinationalization (Hennart, 2007), by looking at
speciﬁc beneﬁts of internationalization that have
not been explored before. In line with Goerzen and
Beamish (2003), we ﬁnd that international strategies
will have different performance impacts depending on
the ‘geographical scope’ (i.e. the number of countries
in which the ﬁrm has invested) and the ‘country envi-
ronment diversity’ (i.e. the economic, political and
cultural differences across countries). Although these
authors suggest that country environment diversity
will have a negative impact on an international ﬁrm’s
performance, whereas more homogeneity should lead
to better results, we show that, for regulated ﬁrms,
country ‘environment homogeneity’ (i.e. the absence
of diversity), at least at the institutional level, could
be a rational strategy for companies facing a strong
nonmarket competition domestically.
Furthermore, our explanation for why ‘environment
homogeneity’ (called institutional closeness here) can
be attractive is not a capability argument regarding pro-
duction. Irrespective of whether a ﬁrm has a competitive
advantage or some non-tradable, very speciﬁc or hard-
to-imitate assets, that is, the major factors explaining
the success of international strategies (Buckley and
Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1979), its internationaliza-
tion moves might still be successful. In the case of
regulated ﬁrms, we show that this comes from the
credibility enhancement that the ﬁrm obtains in its
home market vis-à-vis the regulator. Our argument
complements—but is also different from—the ‘liability
of foreignness’ argument (Zaheer, 1995) underlining
that ﬁrms invest in neighbouring countries because their
knowledge and capabilities are sufﬁciently close so as to
make the investment attractive (Delios and Henisz,
2003; Markusen, 2004). The common point is that, for
both reasons, ﬁrms will often end up investing in
countries that are close to them institutionally. However,
our explanation does not build on any assumptions
regarding resources and capabilities associated with
the target country. On the other hand, we argue that
regulated ﬁrms with limited control of the regulatory
process at home have an additional reason to invest in
neighbouring countries (and thus would tend to do so
more often, perhaps in small amounts) to enhance their
own credibility vis-à-vis the regulator in their home
country. Our argument also provides a rationale for the
puzzle underlined by Holburn (2001), that is, that regu-
lated ﬁrms tend to invest in countries whose regulated
sectors have market structures (from monopsony to
competition) similar to the market structure of the ﬁrm’s
home country. In our framework, comparisons related
to prices and costs are indeed much easier for the regu-
lator to make when market structures are comparable.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on
nonmarket strategies and, more precisely, on how ﬁrms
can integrate market and nonmarket strategies (Baron,
1995, 2001; Hillman and Keim, 1995). The general idea
in the existing literature is that nonmarket strategies
complement market strategies by making market entry
possible, by overcoming regulatory hurdles in the case
of a new technology launch, by increasing competitors’
costs, and so on (Yofﬁe and Bergenstein, 1985). In the
situation presented here, however, we go one step
further in this idea relative to the integration of market
and nonmarket activities. We discuss a situation in
which the regulated ﬁrm attempts to support its do-
mestic market position through political support but,
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because this support is not very effective, the ﬁrm
develops a market strategy (internationalization) that
will strengthen its nonmarket activities (by gaining
credibility or incidence at home). In the end, a market
strategy is developed to support a nonmarket strategy,
a situation which has not yet been highlighted in the
literature.
Regarding nonmarket strategies, our paper also con-
tributes to the literature on the combination of speciﬁc
nonmarket activities (de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo,
2002; Schuler et al., 2002) by showing how traditional
political support (e.g. votes, campaign contributions)
and informational lobbying can be combined.
Third, this paper can also provide insights regarding
public policy. The economic theory of regulation gener-
ally considers a theoretical setup with one regulator and
one (or several) regulated ﬁrms in one country market.
The result is that the information asymmetry makes it
difﬁcult for the regulator to efﬁciently regulate this type
of situation. What happens then when regulated ﬁrms
are multinationals and operate in several markets? Our
model suggests that, in this case, the regulator has less
discretion and thus his or her political superiors (who
represent ﬁnal users) might ﬁnd a way to better control
the regulatory authority they have previously delegated,
preventing the regulator from being too biased against
and/or dependent on the relative nonmarket efforts
regarding lobbying and supports offered to them.
4.2. Limitations and Extensions
There are some additional empirical implications and
testable hypotheses ﬂowing from our model (particu-
larly from Proposition 3). These extensions have to
do with the types of diversiﬁcation in which regulated
ﬁrms might engage, and with the countries that these
ﬁrms might target in the context of their international
expansion.
4.2.1. Types of diversiﬁcation. Considering the
variations in the importance given to foreign countries
as benchmark or informational sources in the home
country (previously summarized by the expected
penalty faced by each regulator for disregarding M’s
report), various types of diversiﬁcation can be expected.
If this importance is low, then ﬁrms will be less inclined
to use international expansion as a way to overcome the
credibility issue they face towards their domestic regula-
tor. On the other hand, this becomes an option as soon
as the importance given to such benchmark reports
becomes high. From this analysis, the following con-
ceptual framework (Table 4) emerges to account for
the diversiﬁcation strategies of regulated ﬁrms.
Even if the key contribution of our paper can be
seen as being in cell (4) in Table 4, the other cells also
stem from our formal framework and can be used to
guide future empirical research. Clear predictions
follow: ceteris paribus, international expansion will be
the highest for ﬁrms in cell (4), and diversiﬁcation in
regulated products will happen mainly for ﬁrms in cell
(1) and diversiﬁcation in unrelated products for ﬁrms
in cell (3). From this perspective, our approach should
encourage future research regarding how international
and product diversiﬁcation interact (Sambharya, 1995;
Wiersema and Bowen, 2008), particularly in the case
of regulated ﬁrms for whom they seem to interact also
through nonmarket activities (Bonardi, 2004; Kashlak
and Joshi, 1994).
4.2.2. Variations regarding target countries. Linked
to the importance given to foreign countries as bench-
marks or informational sources in the home country,
interesting predictions arise when we consider the types
of countries that regulated ﬁrms are likely to target. In
our framework, a foreign country can be a good target
for a regulated ﬁrm for two different reasons: (i) because
there is market growth potential or possibilities to obtain
a monopoly position (traditional reasons) and (ii) because
it helps to solve the credibility issue (a new reason
provided in this paper).
For regulated ﬁrms in developed countries, invest-
ing in geographically/institutionally close countries is
rarely attractive for traditional reasons, as competition
is tough and growth perspectives are low there. How-
ever, a close developed country can be attractive
Table 4. Regulated Firms’ Nonmarket Strategies and Diversiﬁcation
Dominant in domestic nonmarket arena Non-dominant in domestic nonmarket arena
Low importance given to information
from foreign country
(1) Least degree of international expansion.
Diversiﬁcation in regulated products
(2) Poor options. International expansion
will not help solve domestic problems. Rather,
the ﬁrm diversiﬁes in unregulated activities
High importance given to information
from foreign country
(3) Indeterminate—Mix of geographical
diversiﬁcation and diversiﬁcation in
regulated products
(4) Mainly international expansion as a way to
solve the credibility problem
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because it helps solve the credibility issue. On the
other hand, diversiﬁcation in far countries (especially
developing countries) is more attractive for traditional
reasons (stronger market growth and, therefore,
higher expected pay-offs). Yet, operating in develop-
ing countries will probably not help much to enhance
the ﬁrm’s credibility towards the regulator in its
domestic country.
Thus, an important implication follows: the commer-
cial beneﬁts of investing in developing countries need to
be much higher—even correcting by higher cost of
capital or risk—than for investments expanding opera-
tions to neighbouring or developed countries. The
theory behind this proposition is that investing in devel-
oped countries buys credibility at home, and therefore
its true pay-off should include better results at home
than the (correct but unobservable) counter-factual,
where incumbents would suffer higher entry or more
demanding access regulation. More work is certainly
warranted to further explore these dimensions and
empirically test the ideas developed in this paper.
NOTES
1. Here, we leave aside ‘non-strategic’ types of explana-
tions for regulated ﬁrm diversiﬁcation, such as the free
cash-ﬂow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). According to this
hypothesis, managers of ﬁrms with weak internal and
external governance environments, and limited opportu-
nities for proﬁtable growth in their core businesses will
divert resources into diversifying strategies, even where
the latter involve investments with negative net present
values. This type of argument might explain some of
the variance in regulated ﬁrms’ diversiﬁcation perfor-
mances, but we concentrate here on aspects related
to ﬁrm external environment rather than internal and
governance aspects.
2. There is a literature on how ‘soft’ information can be con-
veyed to policy-makers (see Grossman and Helpman
(2001) for a survey). However, it is often difﬁcult for
ﬁrms to convey this information credibly to a regulator
because the ﬁrm’s pay-offs mainly depend on the policy
adopted, which is based on the information disclosed
(Lyon and Maxwell, 2004). Dahm and Porteiro (2008)
developed a model of informational lobbying addres-
sing its credibility and argue that it depends on the
commitment to disclose all (beneﬁcial and damaging)
hard information to the regulator.
3. For broadly measuring the degree of regulatory restric-
tion in ﬁrm home market, we consider here market
shares in the wireless phone market. The underlying
assumption here is that former monopolies that have lost
largest market shares are those that have faced the most
hostile regulatory environment, favouring new entrants
to the detriment of incumbents. Up to a recent period
(and because of technological breakthroughs in wireless
telecom), it was indeed very difﬁcult for new entrants to
expand without signiﬁcant intervention from regulatory
authorities (Bonardi et al., 2009).
4. Clearly, counting the number of countries is a crude mea-
sure of international expansion. Yet, although gathering
good data on the amount invested by each operator would
allow us to contrast our results, these data were not easily
available for most operators. More importantly, the pre-
diction of our model has to do in fact with presence more
than with the amount invested in close countries abroad.
5. See de Figueiredo et al. (1999) for an analysis of
competition among interest groups, in which groups
send biased reports to the regulator, thereby limiting
the discretion and informational advantages of regula-
tors vis-à-vis political ofﬁcials. See also Krishna and
Morgan (2001), where sequential biased reports by
interested experts with opposed interests can reduce
(but not eliminate, unless the rebuttal opportunities are
unbounded) the degree of uncertainty for the decision
maker regarding the true value of a relevant parameter
observed by them.
6. Our deﬁnition of institutional proximity is close to what
Mukand and Rodrik (2005) called ‘closeness in the
underlying state’ when they look at policy convergence.
7. We consider only those operators present in more than
two foreign countries.
8. One potential criticism to Figure 2 could be that part of
the internationalization of European operators was
driven by countries being former colonies. Mali is for
instance a ‘far’ country for FT in Figure 2, but one
cannot ignore the fact that Mali was a French colony.
So there is cultural or historical proximity there. As
we were concerned by this, we recomputed the data by
adding former colonies to the number of close countries
for the relevant operators. We do not report the new
graph here, but when we do this, the overall picture
remains unaffected. As could be expected, BT and FT
move up vertically, but only slightly. Both had quite a
large number of colonies and have invested in them.
FT moves from 0.14 to 0.27 in terms of our index of
‘alike internationalization’. BT moves from 0.3 to
0.42. Qualitatively, however, this does not signiﬁcantly
change the outlook of the ﬁgure. The only operator that
changes quadrants is Telefonica from Spain, which
becomes an outlier on the upper right part of the ﬁgure.
By adding most of the South American countries to the
close countries, Telefonica goes from an index of 0.18
to 0.77. As we will see later in the paper, though, this
does not affect the key argument we are trying to make.
Our argument is about whether the home regulator will
use data from close countries to make regulatory deci-
sions. Despite that Nicaragua was a Spanish colony, it is
somewhat less likely that the Spanish regulator, when
considering regulatory decisions regarding Telefonica in
Spain, will consider comparative data from Nicaragua.
9. The disputes between incumbents and entrants are of
course extended beyond the access price for the use of
the existing infrastructure, but we use this dimension
as an illustration of the general conﬂict between ﬁrms
with opposed interests at home (see Madsen and
Walker, 2007, who look at competitive rivalry in a
deregulated industry).
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10. We focus here on the regulated incumbent’s strategy
and do not consider cases in which the new entrant
could also be (or become) an international player and
provide a competing benchmark to the regulator. These
situations, in any case, would shape varying exogenous
conditions faced by the incumbent ﬁrm and thus would
not modify the model itself.
11. In particular, ﬁxed network costs or economies of scale
are disregarded. Access pricing in the context of Ramsey
pricing (optimal deviations from marginal cost due to
budget constraints and linear pricing) is primarily
discussed in Armstrong et al. (1996).
12. The common agency model here is not one of formal
delegation, but instead one where principals exert
‘economic inﬂuence’ on a common agent, who cannot
refuse to act as such. The incentives or support can be
offered through various means discussed in the litera-
ture, such as making campaign contributions, voicing
opposition or accepting their general policy initiatives,
future employment or economic bribes.
13. Thus, contrary to the most usual agency settings where
the agent is better informed than the principal(s), in
our model, the two principals (ﬁrms) perfectly observe
the action taken by the agent (his or her policy decision
a), and they are both better informed than the agent
regarding the state of nature (d).
14. As foreign regulation might be biased and each vector d
partly reﬂects intrinsic characteristics of each country,
pure imitation (of foreign regulation) is generally unde-
sirable. More generally, multinational ﬁrms cannot be
penalized for reporting different d in different countries.
15. This happens once the ﬁnal price of services Pf is not
fully adjusted to reﬂect different access prices. So, we
implicitly assume that Pf and a are partly (but not fully)
correlated: (i) if Pf and a change by the same amount,
the entrant’s margin ‘m’ (=Pf$ a) would not vary with
a, and this would contradict our assumption about the
entrant’s utility function (preferring a lower access
price); (ii) if Pf remained constant when a changed, no
effect on ﬁnal performance would emerge from various
levels of access price (i.e., its effects would be purely on
the division of rents between ﬁrms, which is not impor-
tant for ﬁnal consumers). See Armstrong et al. (1996).
16. The strength surely depends on several other things,
including the political importance of the ﬁrm in its
country, its role as a major employer, the support of
trade unions, and so on, but we represent only its own eco-
nomic stake as a determinant of the resources dedicated
and useful to shape public policy.
17. If R did adoptM’s report as his or her new expected cost
of access, the simpliﬁcation made here would be fully
correct: CP and CM would now coincide, and thus UR=
$ θ% (a$CP)2 + SI(a) + SE(a)$F% (a$CM)2 would
reduce to UR=$ (θ+F)% (a$CM)2 + SI(a) + SE(a), so
that, in the last equation, θ^ ¼ θþ F and CPM =CM.
18. The interior solution requires that the preferences of the
ﬁrms regarding the policy to be implemented (aI and aE)
are larger than the marginal impact of policy on perfor-
mance (or, in other words, the intrinsic policy preference
of the regulator, θ): if this is not the case, then there is
no room for proﬁtable exchanges of supports and policies.
19. When CP ¼ CIþCEð Þ2 ; then @a'@θ ¼ 3% ½ CP $ CEð Þ %
aE $ aIð )= aE þ aI þ 3θð Þ2; and thus the signs of @a'@θ
and aE$ aI coincide, meaning that, when θ increases,
a* tends to move to the centre of C’s distribution from
the biased choice induced by the stronger interest group
(i.e. if aE> aI, then a* would initially be downward
biased (towards the entrant’s preference) but would then
increase (reduce its bias) as the impact of policy on
efﬁciency—θ—increases).
20. Hill and Hansen (1991) showed, for instance, that the
diversiﬁcation of pharmaceutical ﬁrms has been primar-
ily undertaken to reduce the risks of being dependent
upon a technologically dynamic environment; this sug-
gests, as we do here, that diversiﬁcation investments
might have motives that are not directly related to ﬁnan-
cial performance.
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